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PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL: 
DIMENSIONS AND DETERMINANTS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The determinants of the dimensions that shape a formal system of performance appraisal are studied 
in relation to a sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments. In particular, the factors that 
influence the measures used to evaluate performance, the person who carries out such appraisal and 
its frequency are analysed. Our results show that the characteristics of the establishment exert a 
significant influence on the configuration of performance appraisal. Specifically, we find that the use 
of practices complementary to performance evaluation and the structural factors of the establishment 
are found to correlate closely with the dimensions of formal performance appraisal.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Formal performance appraisal is a human resource management (HRM) practice that has 
attracted considerable attention from both practitioners and scholars (see Fletcher, 2001). The interest 
in the implementation of formal performance appraisal systems stems from the fact that such practice 
may accomplish a wide variety of functions. These functions may include the monitoring of 
employees, the communication of organisational values and objectives to workers, the evaluation of 
hiring and training strategies, and the validation of other HRM practices (see Baron and Kreps, 
1999). In addition, the design of a performance appraisal system is complex due to the multiple 
dimensions involved and because of the various interests in evaluation outcomes among different 
agents. As a result, research on the issue is extensive and has focused on a broad range of aspects (see 
Levy and Williams, 2004). 
One of the topics that has drawn the attention of researchers in the performance evaluation 
field is the influence of organisational context on the implementation of a formal system of 
performance appraisal (see Murphy and Cleveland, 1991). In particular, recent studies have examined 
the relationship between establishment features and the adoption of formal performance appraisal 
(see Addison and Belfield, 2008; Brown and Heywood, 2005; and Grund and Sliwka, 2009). 
However, empirical work on this issue is still scarce, and much remains to be learned about how the 
decision to implement formal performance appraisal is taken by the employer. The  aim here is to 
complement this empirical research and examine the influence that organisational features exert on 
the use of a formal system of performance appraisal, focusing on the different dimensions that 
characterise such a system.  
In the main, existing studies on the implementation of formal performance appraisal have 
concentrated on the analysis of the determinants of the employer’s decision to adopt a formal system 
of appraisal. Since formal performance evaluation is a multidimensional process and, consequently, 
its design may differ significantly among employers, we go a step further in the study of the practice 
at establishment level and analyse the factors that determine how a system of performance evaluation 
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is implemented from a comprehensive perspective. According to Brown and Heywood (2005), 
performance appraisal is adopted when the employer expects to obtain benefits from the use of the 
practice. The idea here is that the employer has to decide not only if it is worth adopting a formal 
system of performance appraisal, but also how this system will be shaped in order to obtain returns. 
As Baron and Kreps (1999) point out, the appropriateness of a system of performance appraisal 
depends on the characteristics of the organisation and the HRM system adopted by the employer. 
With these concerns in mind, and taking into account the determinants of the adoption of 
performance appraisal, we believe that the establishment-level variables that influence the 
configuration of the appraisal process need to be more investigated in greater depth. Brown and 
Heywood (2005) recognise the significance of these issues and acknowledge that “… (our) data do 
not provide information on the intensity of the appraisal process, what instruments are used or how 
the gathered information influences management behaviour towards workers. All of these are 
important dimensions of performance appraisal but they are simply not measured in our data”. 
Our study is based on a Spanish data set relating to HRM practices, which is based on a 
survey carried out with a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments. A major 
advantage of using this data set is that it contains very detailed  information on the dimensions that 
characterise a formal system of performance appraisal at establishment level. The information 
provided enables  analysis of various features of such appraisal that, thus far and to our knowledge, 
have not been studied using establishment-level data. Our empirical strategy starts with an 
examination of the influence of a set of factors on the adoption of a formal system of performance 
appraisal in Spanish establishments. This analysis draws on the work of Brown and Heywood (2005), 
and four groups of variables are included as explanatory factors in our regression equation: workforce 
characteristics, level of job control, complementary HRM practices and structural factors. As 
mentioned above, our main objective is to analyse the determinants of various dimensions of the 
performance appraisal process. Since formal performance appraisal is defined in accordance with a 
number of aspects, we think that it is relevant to investigate the influence of the four groups of 
explanatory factors on the configuration of the practice, not only on the decision to adopt it. First, we 
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study the determinants of the measures used to evaluate performance are addressed. Second, the 
establishment attributes that determine the person who carries out the evaluation are analysed. 
Finally, the influence of our set of explanatory variables on the frequency of the process is estimated.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section, a brief description of the 
dimensions of a performance appraisal system accounted for in this study is given. Then, an overview 
of the theoretical insights regarding the factors that may influence the use of performance appraisal as 
well as its different dimensions is provided. The next section describes the methodology used in our 
empirical analysis. Finally, the findings of the study are described and discussed, and our main 
conclusions presented.  
 
 
DIMENSIONS OF A FORMAL SYSTEM OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL 
 
Since our aim is to examine how establishment features influence the configuration of a 
formal system of performance appraisal, the main aspects of such a system are first described. In 
particular, we focus on three dimensions that should be taken into account when analysing 
performance appraisal at the establishment level: the type of measures used to rate performance, the 
person who carries out the appraisal, and the frequency with which the appraisal is conducted.  
 
Measures of Performance 
 
The performance of a worker can be evaluated using different criteria (see Wall et al., 2004). 
On the one hand, performance may be determined according to objective measures such as the 
number of pieces produced, the value of sales or the quality of output. These measures are directly 
observed both by the person who performs the evaluation and the person being evaluated (see 
Prendergast, 1999). As a consequence, the use of objective measures might simplify appraisal 
through a standardisation of processes. Moreover, it could generate perceptions of equity since the 
parameters that are evaluated are fixed and well-known to employees. However, it is not always 
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possible to rate worker performance according to an objective measure. Jobs often consist of the 
performance of a variety of tasks, and it may be difficult for an employer to evaluate performance 
using a single objective measure. Moreover, when a worker performs different tasks and is assessed 
using a particular objective criteria such as the number of units of output, (s)he may be tempted to 
concentrate on the activity that is most directly linked to the performance measure used. In the words 
of Baron and Kreps (1999), this may give rise to a problem of “misalignment of incentives”.   
On the other hand, evaluation may be determined according to subjective performance 
measures, based on the evaluator’s judgements (see Baker, 1994). The use of subjective measures 
provides flexibility in the appraisal system, since it is possible to adapt the evaluation process to the 
particular circumstances of a job. In addition, it makes it possible to account for the different 
dimensions of a worker’s job, avoiding the potential problem of “misalignment of incentives” (see 
Prendergast, 1999). However, it may enhance perceptions of inequity among workers since ratings 
are not based on observable and clearly-defined criteria, and it could also give rise to distortions and 
inefficient behaviour. Subjective criteria may be used instead of objective measures, but both types of 
measures are commonly implemented in conjunction with one another and act as complementary 
determinants of performance. In light of these concerns, the particular features of the establishment 
may be expected to affect the type of criteria used in formal performance appraisal.  
 
Who Evaluates Performance 
 
When designing a system of appraisal, the issue of who will perform the evaluation is a key 
concern. This person is frequently an employee’s immediate superior (see Murphy and Cleveland, 
1995), but a manager at a higher level may carry out this task as well. In organisations with a formal 
HRM framework, evaluation could be carried out by a person from the human resource management 
department (HRM department). In some contexts, subordinates, peers or even customers provide 
useful information on certain aspects of worker performance: subordinates are in a good position to 
observe leadership abilities; peers may be able to evaluate interpersonal relationships; and customers 
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can assess the quality of service. Since appraisal is often aimed at rating various attributes of a 
worker’s performance, evaluation from different sources is commonly required (see Bohlander and 
Snell, 2009). The immediate superior is the figure that most commonly monitors workers, but a better 
qualified supervisor may perform the appraisal when the evaluation process is complex or when 
specific appraisal needs emerge (see Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). For several reasons, the choice of 
the person carrying out the appraisal is crucial for organisational success. For example, supervisors 
need to be able to communicate the results of the appraisal to workers effectively, especially if the 
purpose of appraisal is to provide feedback to employees. In addition, the use of a formal system of 
performance appraisal is costly for the organisation, so identifying the adequate supervisor is 
important if the organisation wants to obtain returns from its investment in the implementation of the 
process. All in all, the quality and effectiveness of a system of appraisal depends largely on the skill 
of the person performing the assessment, so the choice of an appropriate supervisor should be a major 
concern for organisations implementing a formal system of evaluation (see Nurse, 2005).  
 
Frequency of Appraisal  
 
Another significant feature of performance appraisal is the frequency of assessment. The 
timing of appraisal should be carefully taken into consideration, since frequency could affect the 
results of the process. For example, Werner and Bolino (1997) state that a high rating frequency 
increases evaluation accuracy as well as its perceived fairness and worker satisfaction. The aim 
pursued of the performance assessment process may influence its timing (see Murphy and Cleveland, 
1995). Hence, in many organisations performance appraisal is carried out annually, since the 
administrative decisions based on the appraisal results are taken yearly. This is the case of pay 
increases or employment promotions. In contrast, evaluations whose objective is to provide 
employees with feedback will be performed more often. There are also organisations in which the 
frequency of performance evaluation does not follow a fixed pattern. Moreover, the time-frame of 
performance evaluation depends on the tasks carried out by a worker and the nature of the job, since 
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the type of work determines if the results are observed in the short, medium or long-term (see Baron 
and Kreps, 1999).  
 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE CONFIGURATION OF PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL  
 
Following Addison and Belfield (2008) and Brown and Heywood (2005), a number of 
variables that may contribute to explaining the configuration of performance appraisal systems are 
identified. These variables can be classified into four categories: workforce characteristics, level of 
job control, related human resource management practices and structural features of the 
establishment. In what follows, the variables included in each of these four groups are listed, as well 
as their expected influence on the adoption of a system of performance evaluation and the dimensions 
of the practice. 
  
Workforce Characteristics 
 
Brown and Heywood (2005) state that the expected tenure of the workforce may influence 
the probability of adopting a formal system of performance appraisal. In particular, the authors argue 
that the proportion of casual workers, women and long-tenured employees, as well as the turnover 
rate of the establishment, are related to the use of a formal system of evaluation. According to these 
authors, if performance appraisal is used as a tool for monitoring worker effort and set compensation, 
establishments with short-tenured employees are more likely to implement a formal system of 
performance evaluation. Moreover, establishments with short-tenured employees are more likely to 
use appraisal in order to assign workers to jobs and take dismissal or retention decisions. By contrast, 
Brown and Heywood (2005) point out that if the purpose of appraisal is to promote worker 
identification with organisational objectives and develop human capital, a long-tenured workforce 
will have a positive influence on the adoption of performance appraisal.  
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Following the arguments presented by Brown and Heywood (2005), we expect that 
workforce characteristics  to be related to the measures used to evaluate performance. As stated in the 
previous paragraph, those establishments with a high proportion of short-tenured workers use 
performance appraisal to monitor employee output and reward them accordingly. Milkovich and 
Widgor (1991) mention that a system of appraisal that pursues this goal is characterised by an 
“emphasis on standardisation, objective measurement, psychometric properties (validity, reliability, 
bias, etc.)”. Moreover, short-tenured workers are frequently assigned to simple jobs for which it is 
easier to implement routine monitoring processes based on objective criteria. Hence, we hypothesise 
that, in establishments with a large proportion of short-tenured workers, it is more likely that 
performance appraisal will be based on objective criteria. This expected correlation is supported by 
an additional argument in the case of women. Women are believed to sort into establishments that 
adopt employment practices which leave less scope for discrimination. Using German data, Jirjahn 
and Stephan (2004) find support for the hypothesis that women prefer piece-rate remuneration 
schemes because the use of objective measures of performance avoids wage discrimination.  
However, there are other arguments that could help to explain the relationship between the 
proportion of casual and female employees in the measures used to evaluate performance. In Spain, 
employees frequently work on temporary contracts before they get permanent jobs. In other words, 
temporary work is used by employers as a probationary period before offering workers a permanent 
position within the organisation. During this probationary period, the employee will be appraised 
comprehensively in order to decide if (s)he is to be retained. If the employer wants to evaluate 
various dimensions of a worker’s performance in order to take this decision, it may not be useful to 
employ an objective measure. An alternative idea that could help to support these arguments is the 
following. Workers tend to favour the use of objective measures of performance because they are 
easily verifiable and, consequently, are regarded as more equitable. Both casual and female workers 
are frequently subject to discrimination, poorer employment conditions and lower employment 
protection in comparison with other employees. As a result, it may be that, in contrast to workers 
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with a higher influence over management decisions, they cannot insist on appraisal using objective 
criteria and are more frequently subject to subjective assessment.  
The person who evaluates performance may also be influenced by the average tenure of the 
workforce at the establishment. As we have pointed out, the immediate superior is the figure that 
most frequently rates worker performance, whereas other supervisors with more specific abilities are 
in charge of the appraisal when the evaluation is complex or when there are specific appraisal needs. 
Hence, for workers with a long-expected tenure, performance appraisal is intended to provide 
feedback, communicate organisational objectives and develop human capital, so the process of 
appraisal needs to be more detailed and complex. Thus, we argue that, in establishments with a high 
proportion of short-tenured workers, supervision will be carried out by an immediate superior. 
However, when the proportion of long-tenured employees is high, it is more likely that such appraisal 
will be carried out by a person at a higher level who is able to identify worker strengths and 
weaknesses and communicate effectively with employees.  
The tenure of the workforce could have a bearing on the timing of the evaluation process. 
Hence, employees at an early stage in their careers will be subject to more frequent evaluations in 
order to assess if they fit a specific job position, to identify abilities and training needs, or to take 
promotion decisions (see Lazear, 1998). In contrast, as a worker’s career develops, evaluations 
become less frequent and usually stabilise. Hence, the percentage of short-tenured workers in an 
establishment may be positively related to the frequency of evaluation. On the other hand, a negative 
correlation is expected between the proportion of workers with high tenure and the periodicity of 
performance appraisal.  
 
Job Control 
 
As Brown and Heywood (2005) point out, an establishment is more likely to implement a 
system of performance evaluation when workers have control over their work and, consequently, 
when they can alter their performance according to the results the appraisal yields. Moreover, in 
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order to take full advantage of a system of performance evaluation, an establishment requires a 
considerable amount of supervisory force. It may also be the case that performance appraisal is 
implemented jointly with other forms of monitoring so that a high number of supervisors is needed 
(see Brown and Heywood, 2005). Building on these arguments, we predict that job autonomy and the 
number of supervisors per employee will be positively related to the implementation of a formal 
system of performance appraisal. 
Regarding performance measurement, Brown and Heywood (2005) point out that “formal 
appraisal will yield benefits when each worker has substantial scope in determining their tasks and 
effort levels and the results of these choices are not immediately obvious”. Under these 
circumstances, it may be difficult to measure worker performance using a standardised objective 
measure, since it prevents the adaptation of the evaluation to different circumstances and fails to 
account for the different dimensions of a worker’s job. Consequently, we predict that the degree of 
autonomy that employees have in their work will be negatively related to the use of formal appraisal 
based solely on objective criteria. In addition, subjective criteria are applied when a job is complex or 
when the identification and measurement of output are difficult. Hence, the use of subjective 
appraisal cannot be based on the implementation of a standardised process; rather, it relies on the 
judgements of the supervisors in charge of the practice. As a result, we hypothesise that the number 
of supervisors in the workplace will be positively associated with the use of performance appraisal 
based on subjective measures of performance or on a combination of subjective and objective 
measures. 
When workers have substantive autonomy in their work, the appraisal process is more 
complex and it may be difficult for an immediate superior to evaluate performance. According to 
Murphy and Cleveland (1995), the immediate superior is well-suited to rate general performance, 
whereas a supervisor at a higher level is able to determine the particular dimensions of performance 
that are most important to the organisation and the behaviours required to improve worker 
performance. Hence, it is plausible to think that when worker autonomy is high, performance 
appraisal will be carried out by professionals at a high level in the organisation or by a person from 
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the HRM department who is formally trained in HRM.  Finally, the presence of a high number of 
supervisors may indicate that worker supervision is valuable to the organisation, so that formal 
performance appraisal is part of a more general system of monitoring. If monitoring is considered to 
be beneficial for the establishment, a higher frequency of performance appraisal may be anticipated. 
In other words, it may be the case that in establishments that devote extensive resources to 
supervision (such as a large number of supervisors), performance appraisal is carried out with a 
higher frequency.  
 
HRM Practices 
 
Certain HRM practices are implemented in conjunction with performance appraisal due to 
the existence of complementarities and a joint impact on the organisation’s performance (see Becker 
and Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; or Ichniowski et al., 1997). One such practice is the provision of 
training. According to Brown and Heywood (2005), monitoring worker performance may be 
desirable when training is provided, since employers could use performance appraisal as an 
instrument to determine training needs and evaluate training results. Another complementary practice 
considered in the literature is pay based on individual performance. One of the main purposes of an 
appraisal system is to measure worker performance, which in turn is essential to establishing an 
incentive system based on individual output. Consequently, the provision of training and pay for 
individual performance may be expected to exert a positive influence on the probability of adopting a 
formal performance appraisal system. 
We acknowledge that complementary HRM practices may have an impact on the measures 
used to evaluate performance. According to Brown and Heywood (2005), pay for individual 
performance may be used as an incentive system for workers who are not motivated by deferred 
payments. Since performance appraisal might also accomplish this objective, both practices could be 
jointly implemented as part of a system aimed at motivating employees (see Drago and Heywood, 
1995; Heywood et al., 1997; and Shields, 2002). We have already noted that a system of appraisal 
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whose objectives are to monitor performance and reward workers is characterised by a 
standardisation of processes and the use of objective measures. Hence, we expect to observe a 
positive correlation between the use of individual pay for performance and the adoption of formal 
performance appraisal based on objective criteria. Second, formal performance appraisal may serve 
as an instrument to determine training needs, evaluate training results, provide feedback to workers 
and guide their development according to the results of evaluation. In other words, if training is 
provided, formal performance appraisal could be used for a developmental purpose (see Boswell and 
Boudreau, 2002). When formal evaluation has a developmental goal, the supervisor needs to assess 
worker performance in a comprehensive way, paying attention to various aspects of the job. This 
exhaustive evaluation might be more difficult if an objective measure of performance is used. On the 
contrary, when appraisal is used to provide feedback to workers, it may be valuable to measure 
performance using objective criteria so that workers can understand the results of evaluation and use 
them to improve future performance. In light of these arguments, no precise effect of the provision of 
training on the measures used to evaluate performance can be predicted. Therefore,  the empirical 
analysis carried out here may enable significant clarification of the correlation between this 
complementary practice and performance measurement. 
Regarding the person that conducts the evaluation, we have pointed out that establishments 
may adopt both formal performance appraisal and individual pay for performance as part of a 
monitoring and compensation scheme. An appraisal system that pursues this objective is expected to 
be less complex than developmental performance appraisal, so it may be carried out by the workers’ 
immediate superior. Consequently, we anticipate that the use of pay for individual performance will 
be positively related to the probability that an immediate superior performs the evaluation. Finally, 
we also expect to find a correlation between the provision of individual incentives and frequency of 
appraisal. Pay for individual performance is an administrative decision that requires an evaluation 
process. Evaluations whose objective is to take administrative decisions will be less frequent than 
those aimed at developing human capital (see Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). Consequently, a 
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negative correlation may be expected between the provision of pay for individual performance to 
workers and the frequency of performance appraisal.  
 
Structural Factors 
 
Brown and Heywood (2005) point to the existence of a correlation between some structural 
factors and the use of performance appraisal. First, they predict a positive influence of establishment 
size due to both economies of scale and the difficulty of monitoring workers’ effort in large 
organisations. Second, labour costs have also been identified as a potential positive influence in the 
use of a formal system of evaluation. The abovementioned authors also argue that this is due to the 
fact that “the scale economies are more likely to be overcome when labour cost is important for firms 
of the same size”. In addition, they state that the presence of human resource professionals may 
favour the use of performance appraisal, since it is related to the adoption of more sophisticated 
employment practices. Finally, they make reference to union influence as a circumstance that may 
cause difficulties when trying to implement a system of appraisal. Following these arguments, 
positive effects of establishment size, the proportion of labour costs in total production costs and the 
presence of a HRM department are to be expected in relation to the use of performance appraisal, and 
a negative effect of the influence exerted by trade unions at the establishment. 
Regarding performance measures, several possible relationships with the structural factors 
may be predicted. First, as the size of the establishment increases, monitoring difficulties emerge 
because it is more complicated to observe the performance of workers directly (see Grund and 
Sliwka, 2009). This leads us to believe that employers in large establishments may choose to 
overcome the monitoring difficulties through the implementation of a formal and more standardised 
system of appraisal based on objective criteria. Moreover, Grund and Sliwka (2009) point out that 
large firms need to compare worker performance in order to take promotion decisions, so the 
adoption of a standard system of appraisal becomes useful. On the other hand, large establishments 
may devote a higher amount of resources to the appraisal process. In addition, it is more likely that 
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they have a higher number of supervisors and, more generally, a higher number of professionals 
qualified to carry out a formal process of appraisal. Although subjective monitoring is less 
straightforward than objective supervision and requires the use of a higher amount of resources, large 
establishments may find it easier to implement a system of appraisal based on subjective measures. 
Hence, no precise relationship between firm size and the measures of performance appraisal is 
anticipated. Second, unions tend to oppose the use of practices that discriminate against workers. As 
far as performance appraisal is concerned, unions may be expected to promote evaluations that are 
carried out with fairness and objectivity. Moreover, unions tend to promote a standardisation of 
human resource practices in order to avoid differences among workers. Consequently, we predict a 
positive relationship between union influence and the use of performance appraisal based on 
objective criteria. 
As noted earlier, managers and workers in small firms work closely together, so performance 
may be easily determined. However, when the size of the establishment increases, the degree of 
hierarchy also rises (see Drago and Heywood, 1995). As a result, the distance between workers and 
decision-makers is extended, and it becomes more difficult for decision-makers to monitor worker 
performance (see Brown and Heywood, 2005). In order to reduce the monitoring difficulties caused 
by such extensive chains of command, large establishments may rely on the immediate supervisor as 
a figure that closely observes worker performance. As a result, a positive influence of the size 
variable on the probability that the appraisal is conducted by an immediate superior may be expected.  
As far as the frequency of appraisal is concerned, our hypothesis is that the size of the 
establishment and the proportion of labour costs will contribute to overcoming the fixed costs of 
implementing performance appraisal. Consequently, we think that the frequency of appraisal rises in 
relation to establishment size and as the proportion of labour costs in total production costs increases. 
On the other hand, the existence of a HRM department within the establishment means that human 
resources are assumed to be key to business success. If human resources constitute an important asset 
for the organisation, it is expected that the process of appraisal will be exhaustive and, therefore, 
time-consuming. In addition, we have already pointed out that the presence of a HRM department is 
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associated with the adoption of complex practices. If the system of appraisal adopted by an 
organisation is very sophisticated, it will take considerable time to collect information about worker 
performance and the periodicity of evaluation will be low. These concerns prompt the hypothesis that 
the existence of a HRM department will be negatively related to the frequency of performance 
appraisal. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data and Variable Description 
 
The data was gathered through personal interviews with managers in Spanish manufacturing 
plants with fifty or more employees, and represents a unique source of information regarding a range 
of HRM practices in Spanish firms. Information was collected at plant level, as this is the unit at 
which decisions related to the implementation of the relevant practices are taken. Furthermore, 
knowledge of the issues included in the questionnaire is expected to be greater at plant level and, as a 
consequence, the data obtained should be more reliable. 
The process of development of the database was as follows. Once the objectives and scope of 
our study were defined, and in order to properly design the questionnaire, we carried out a thorough 
examination of the literature related to the purpose of the project. In light of the information gathered, 
a first draft of the questionnaire was drawn up jointly by the members of the research group and the 
firm in charge of the fieldwork. The questionnaire was pre-tested in nine plants and then modified in 
several ways to come up with the final version.  
Most of the information on HRM refers exclusively to blue-collar workers, that is, workers 
involved directly in the production process. The reason for restricting the analysis to this category of 
employees is due to the existence of a range of different internal labour markets with different 
features within the same organisation. Limiting the study to manual workers makes comparisons 
across establishments easier.  
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The data was obtained in 2006 through personal interviews with one of the managers at the 
plant. We considered that questions should be addressed either to the general manager or the human 
resource manager. In practice, the most frequently interviewed figure was the human resource 
manager. The interviews with managers who agreed to answer our questionnaire were performed by 
professionals with specialized training in computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The 
establishments were first approached by letter or email, indicating the goals of the survey and 
including a copy of the questionnaire. The final sample comprises 1,001 establishments, which 
matches expectations regarding the size of the data set and yields a response rate of 34.1 per cent.  
The data set contains information on various dimensions of the process of performance 
appraisal, which enables an in-depth analysis of the practice. Hence, questionnaire respondents were 
asked about the presence and coverage of a formal system of performance evaluation for production 
workers. In addition, the questionnaire addresses whether evaluation is based on objective or 
subjective measures of performance. The survey also includes questions that refer to the person 
carrying out the appraisal: a worker’s immediate superior, another line manager or a person from the 
HRM department. Finally, information on the frequency of the evaluation is provided. Hence, 
respondents were asked if appraisal is carried out biennially, annually, biannually or with a higher 
periodicity.  
As already detailed above, four groups of explanatory variables are included in the analysis. 
The category of workforce characteristics contains the percentage of casual workers, females and 
employees over 50 years old, as well as the number of workers that stopped working in the 
establishment in the last year. Two variables related to job control are taken into account: a measure 
of the degree of autonomy of workers over their work and the number of supervisors per employee. 
Two variables that represent HRM practices complementary to the use of formal performance 
appraisal are also considered. These practices are the provision of off-the-job training to workers and 
the adoption of pay linked to individual performance. Four variables representing structural factors 
are included in the regressions: the number of employees in the establishment, the percentage of 
labour costs in total production costs, the presence of a HRM department, and the influence of unions 
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over workers. Finally, 12 manufacturing categories are included as controls in the analysis. With the 
exception of the general characteristics of the establishment (i.e. the number of employees, the labour 
costs, the presence of a HRM department and the industrial sector), the rest of variables refer to 
production workers. The sample means, standard deviations and definitions of the variables 
concerning the process of appraisal, as well as the explanatory variables, are presented in Table 1. 
Given missing values for some of the variables, the final sample of establishments used in the 
estimations comprises 645 observations. 
 
Estimation Procedure 
 
Our empirical analysis involved studying the determinants of the dimensions of a formal 
system of performance appraisal for production workers. The first step is to estimate the determinants 
of the use of performance appraisal at firms in which at least 50 per cent of production workers are 
covered by the practice. This model will also be used as a selection equation in the regressions 
concerning the different dimensions of appraisal. Second, the factors that influence the measures used 
to evaluate performance are examined. At this point, a potential sample selection bias, known as 
incidental truncation, emerges (see Heckman, 1979). The incidental truncation is due to the fact that 
only data on the dependent variable (i.e. the measures of performance) for establishments in which a 
formal evaluation system exists is available (see Wooldridge, 2003). Consequently, this is taken into 
account in the estimation of the equations of interest using the sample selection equation mentioned 
above.  
In addition, the determinants of the person who evaluates performance are estimated. The 
evaluation may be carried out by a worker’s immediate superior, another line manager or a person 
from the HRM department. Therefore, three sample selection models are estimated following the 
aforementioned process. Finally, the influence of our set of explanatory variables on the frequency of 
the performance appraisal is studied. Again, only establishments which have adopted a formal system 
of evaluation provide information on the frequency of appraisal. Consequently, this potential 
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selection bias is taken into account and a sample selection model using our first model as the 
selection equation is estimated.  
With the exception of the industry sector, it should be noted that the same explanatory 
variables are included in all the models estimated. Since it is the factor used as the selection variable, 
the industry sector appears in the estimation of the probability that an establishment uses a formal 
system of performance appraisal (the selection equation in the sample selection models) but not in the 
other equations. This specification satisfies the “exclusion restriction” and avoids a potential problem 
of multicollinearity (see Wooldridge, 2003). The reason for using the industry sector as the selection 
variable rests on our belief that the production process may influence the employer’s decision to 
adopt a formal system of appraisal. Certain aspects relating to the industry sector, such as 
technological requirements, may favour or compromise the adoption of a performance appraisal 
system. Hence, in some industries, individual performance is more easily identified and measured, 
which in turn affects the possibility of using formal performance appraisal and obtaining the benefits 
that may be obtained from the practice. However, no argument for an incidence of the industry on the 
dimensions that characterise such a system has been discerned. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
The results of the estimated models regarding the use of a formal system of performance 
appraisal as well as the different dimensions of the process are presented in Tables 2 to 5. 
As far as the probability of using a formal system of performance appraisal is concerned, 
none of the variables representing workforce characteristics emerge as significant in the analysis (see 
Table 2). These results indicate that workforce tenure has no bearing on the adoption of a formal 
performance appraisal system in Spanish manufacturing establishments. Concerning the variables 
related to job control, these are not significantly correlated with the adoption of a formal system of 
performance appraisal. These results match the findings of Addison and Belfield (2008) for Great 
Britain. As a possible explanation, these authors suggest that workers have substantial autonomy in 
 19  
their work, whereby they can take better decisions than their supervisors or managers, so the 
organisation need not evaluate them using a formal system of performance appraisal. With regard to 
the use of complementary practices, the estimations confirm the idea that the provision of pay for 
individual performance exerts a positive influence on the probability of using performance appraisal. 
In addition, we observe that in establishments where production workers receive off-the-job training, 
the use of a formal appraisal procedure is more likely. As stated in the theoretical framework section, 
this correlation may indicate that establishments use performance appraisal as an instrument to take 
and evaluate training decisions. Finally, the analysis of the structural factors shows that the size of 
the establishment is positively related to the use of performance appraisal, but the rest of explanatory 
variables representing structural factors do not seem to influence the adoption of such a system. 
Table 3 displays the results of the multinomial probit regressions for the performance 
measures, taking the use of both objective and subjective criteria as the reference category. A positive 
relationship may be traced between the proportion of casual workers and the use of objective criteria 
in performance measurement. As stated in the theoretical section, this finding may be due to the fact 
that, for casual workers, performance appraisal is used as a monitoring tool characterised by a 
standardisation of the process and the use of objective measures (see Milkovich and Widgor, 1991). 
Our results show that the proportion of females exerts a significant and positive effect on the use of 
appraisal based on subjective measures. If women are subject to discrimination at work, poorer 
working conditions and lower participation in decisions concerning their appraisal in comparison to 
other groups of workers, it is possible that they are rarely evaluated using objective criteria. 
Regarding the job control variables, the results support our idea that the degree of autonomy of 
workers compromises performance evaluation based solely on objective measures. The number of 
supervisors per worker is also negatively related to the adoption of performance appraisal based on 
objective criteria. This result seems to indicate that when the establishment devote a large amount of 
resources to supervision, it is less likely that appraisal is based only on objective criteria. Finally, 
neither the complementary practices nor the structural factors that characterise the establishment are 
significantly correlated with the measures used to evaluate performance.  
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The results concerning the person who carries out performance appraisal are presented in 
Table 4. First, the percentage of workers over 50 years old correlates positively with the probability 
that the appraisal is carried out by a manager other than the immediate superior. If we assume that 
this variable is a proxy for the proportion of workers with a high attachment to the organisation (so 
that they do not need to be directly monitored by an immediate superior) and who have developed 
firm-specific human capital (so that specific evaluation by a HRM specialist is not required), it is 
plausible to conclude that a line manager is well suited to evaluate their performance. Second, in 
organisations with a high turnover rate, it is less likely that the immediate superior will evaluate  
worker performance. This result points to the fact that in firms where there are frequent changes in 
the workforce, it is difficult for the immediate superior to monitor worker performance. Regarding 
the job control variables, no evidence to support a relationship between the degree of autonomy of 
workers and the person who evaluates performance has been found. As far as the complementary 
practices are concerned, a positive impact of the use of pay for individual performance on the 
Immediate Superior variable is shown. Moreover, the explanatory variable correlates negatively with 
the probability that performance appraisal is conducted by another line manager and a person from 
the HRM department. This finding is consistent with our belief that employers may use both pay for 
individual performance and formal appraisal as part of a monitoring and compensation system that 
can be carried out by the worker’s immediate superior. Training also has a negative influence on the 
probability that a person from the HRM department carries out the appraisal. According to Brown 
and Heywood (2005), workers who have received training are more productive than other employees. 
Therefore, it may be beneficial for the employer to observe them closely in order to avoid significant 
productivity losses. Consequently, a person from the HRM department may not be well-suited to 
carry out the monitoring of trained workers because such a figure who has limited with the employee 
in comparison to an immediate superior or a manager at a higher level. We find that the size of the 
establishment is positively related to the probability that an immediate superior carries out the 
evaluation, and it correlates negatively with the Another Line Manager and Person From HRM 
Department variables. Since large establishments have monitoring difficulties due to extensive chains 
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of command, it is plausible to think that they prefer to assign this task to a person who can observe 
worker performance closely.  
The results of the determinants of the frequency of performance appraisal provide mixed 
support for our hypotheses (see Table 5); the turnover rate of the establishment favours a higher 
frequency of evaluation, but the rest of variables representing workforce characteristics do not 
emerge as statistically significant in the analysis. These results indicate that when the turnover of 
workers in the establishment is high, the employer is interested in a frequent evaluation of workers. 
This frequent evaluation may be due to monitoring concerns or to the need to assign new workers to 
jobs. Contrary to the expected outcome, no positive effect of the number of supervisors on the 
frequency of appraisal has been found. The findings show that the adoption of a system of pay for 
individual performance correlates negatively with the dependent variable. As a possible explanation 
of this result, we have already mentioned that evaluation for administrative purposes such as pay 
determination is usually carried out with a lower frequency than developmental appraisal (see 
Murphy and Cleveland, 1995).  
Finally, the results concerning the structural factors of the establishment are as follows. The 
proportion of labour costs correlates positively with frequency of appraisal, but the size of the 
establishment emerge as a negative determinant of the dependent variable. As stated in the theoretical 
section, the presence of a HRM department negatively influences the periodicity of appraisal. In 
addition, performance evaluation is more frequent as union influence increases. Overall, the results 
concerning the effect of union influence on the dependent variables suggest that, contrary to the 
expected outcome, unions do not oppose the use of performance appraisal. In fact, our findings 
suggest that unions promote the adoption of a formal system of appraisal carried out with a high 
frequency, which is in line with the results offered by Addison and Belfield (2008). The adoption of a 
formal system of performance appraisal implies that evaluation is determined according to an 
established procedure. This formal procedure may contribute to reducing arbitrariness in the 
evaluation process, and arbitrariness in decision-making is a condition that unions try to avoid.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have drawn upon the work of Addison and Belfield (2008) and Brown and Heywood 
(2005) in this study to analyse the implementation of performance appraisal systems in the Spanish 
manufacturing industry. In contrast with these previous studies, our work is not limited to the analysis 
of the relationship between establishment characteristics and the use of performance evaluation. Our 
main focus was to examine how establishment features correlate with the dimensions that shape a 
formal performance appraisal system. The idea that underlies this analysis is that the attributes of an 
organisation influence not only the decision to adopt a system of performance appraisal but also its 
particular configuration. 
According to our estimations, the adoption of a system of pay for individual performance and 
the provision of training exert a positive and significant influence on the probability of adopting 
performance appraisal. Moreover, the two explanatory factors have an influence on the dimensions of 
appraisal considered in this study. As mentioned above, there is an extensive body of research that 
advocates the joint implementation of certain HRM practices in order to obtain improvements in 
organisational performance and worker outcomes (see Kato, 2006, for a review of studies on these 
topics). Among these practices, formal performance appraisal, pay for performance systems and the 
provision of training have been identified jointly with information sharing, participation and 
comprehensive selection (see Becker and Gerhart, 1996; or Huselid, 1995). Although we have not 
accounted for the adoption of additional HRM practices, the use of pay for performance and the 
provision of training are considered to be crucial elements in an effective process of performance 
management (see Dransfield, 2000).  
For the other three groups of explanatory variables included in the analysis, we obtain mixed 
results. In contrast with the findings in Addison and Belfield (2008) and Brown and Heywood (2005), 
the tenure hypothesis is not supported by our data. However, we find some significant correlations 
between the characteristics of the workforce and the configuration of performance appraisal. With the 
exception of the size of the establishment, neither the variables related to job control nor the 
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structural features of the establishment seem to have a crucial role in explaining the adoption of 
performance appraisal systems. However, these explanatory variables significantly influence the 
dimensions of appraisal. More precisely, the job control factors are correlated to the performance 
measures, whereas the structural factors are significant determinants of the frequency of appraisal.  
In general, significant differences are obtained with respect to the findings of the Australian 
and British studies. These differences point to a particular configuration of the process of formal 
performance appraisal in Spain in comparison with the other countries studied. However, 
understanding the implications of institutions for the adoption of HRM practices is a complex issue 
(see Godard, 2010). Despite the fact that the two contexts share certain common features, Addison 
and Belfield (2008) and Brown and Heywood (2005) also find significant differences in the factors 
that determine performance appraisal in Australia and Great Britain. These differences, in 
conjunction with the results of the present study, suggest that further research is needed regarding the 
use of performance appraisal systems and the influence of the institutional framework. 
Although our study reflects certain caveats such as those inherent to the use of cross-section 
data, we provide evidence in favour of the idea that the characteristics of the establishment affect not 
only the decision to adopt formal performance appraisal but also the dimensions that shape the 
practice. Overall, we can conclude that additional work on the relationship between organisational 
circumstances and performance appraisal dimensions is needed, but we hope that this study 
contributes to a better understanding of the topic and encourages the development of future research 
on the configuration of performance appraisal.  
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TABLES  
 
TABLE 1. Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics  
Variable 
 
Definition Mean Standard Deviation 
Dimensions of a  formal system of performance appraisal 
Performance Appraisal 1 if any formal system of performance appraisal is used for at 
least 50 per cent of production workers; 0 otherwise. 
0.371 0.483 
Measures 1 if appraisal is based on both objective and subjective criteria; 
2 if appraisal is based only on objective criteria; 3 if appraisal is 
based only on subjective criteria 
2.481 0.626 
Immediate Superior 1 if the process of appraisal is carried out by an immediate 
superior; 0 otherwise. 
0.528 0.500 
Another Line Manager 1 if the process of appraisal is carried out by another line 
manager; 0 otherwise 
0.354 0.479 
Person From HRM Department 1 if the process of appraisal is carried out by a person from the 
HRM department; 0 otherwise 
0.280 0.450 
Frequency 1 if appraisal is carried out biennially; 2 if appraisal is carried 
out annually; 3 if appraisal is carried out biannually; 4 if 
appraisal is carried out quarterly or with a higher frequency;. 
1.788 0.952 
Explanatory factors 
Percent Casuals Percentage of production workers that are casual workers. 
 
14.014 16.264 
Percent Female  Percentage of production workers that are female.  
 
22.465 25.715 
Percent Over 50  Percentage of production workers that are over 50 years old. 
 
17.025 16.989 
Turnover Percentage of production workers that stopped working in the 
establishment in the last year. 
9.967 13.417 
Autonomy  Degree of autonomy of production workers over their work.  
 
4.609 2.099 
Supervisors Per Worker Average number of supervisors per production worker. 
 
0.093 0.090 
Individual Pay For Performance 1 if pay based on individual performance is used for production 
workers; 0 otherwise. 
 
0.348 0.477 
Training Percentage of production workers that received off-the-job 
training in the last year. 
 
37.825 35.834 
HRM  Department 1 if there is a department at the establishment or firm that deals 
with HRM issues; 0 otherwise. 
 
0.712 0.453 
Labour Costs Percentage of labour costs over total production costs. 
 
31.673 17.220 
Size Number of workers at the establishment (logarithm).  
 
4.780 0.787 
Union Influence Employer’s perception of union influence over production 
workers: 1 if very low influence; 2 if low influence; 3 if medium 
influence; 4 if high influence; 5 if very high influence. 
 
2.910 1.151 
Industrial Sector 12 manufacturing categories included    
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TABLE 2. Determinants of the Use of a Formal System of Performance Appraisal 
Variable Use of a Formal Performance Appraisal 
System 
Constant -1.750*** 
(0.429) 
Percent Casuals -0.573 
(0.393) 
Percent Female  0.015 
(0.230) 
Percent Over 50  -0.262 
(0.319) 
Turnover 0.167 
(0.417) 
Autonomy  0.034 
(0.026) 
Supervisors Per Worker 
 
-0.867 
(0.650) 
Individual Pay For Performance 0.461*** 
(0.109) 
Training 0.357** 
(0.155) 
HRM Department 0.074 
(0.130) 
Size 0.186** 
(0.075) 
Union Influence -0.045 
(0.049) 
Labour Costs  0.184 
(0.311) 
Industry Controls Yes 
Chi-squared 51.44*** 
Log likelihood -403.36 
Number of observations 646 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3. Determinants of the Measures Used to Evaluate Performance 
 
Variable Formal Performance Appraisal  
is Based  
on Objective Criteria 
Formal Performance Appraisal  
is Based  
on Subjective Criteria 
Constant 1.392 
(0.934) 
0.129 
(1.425) 
Percent Casuals 1.917* 
(0.999) 
2.002 
(1.389) 
Percent Female  0.000 
(0.492) 
1.054* 
(0.632) 
Percent Over 50  0.486 
(0.747) 
0.277 
(1.114) 
Turnover -0.981 
(1.176) 
-0.881 
(1.722) 
Autonomy  -0.133** 
(0.062) 
-0.105 
(0.087) 
Supervisors Per Worker 
 
-5.953*** 
(2.247) 
-1.727 
(3.050) 
Individual Pay For Performance -0.075 
(0.243) 
-0.038 
(0.349) 
Training -0.507 
(0.341) 
-0.360 
(0.480) 
HRM Department -0.393 
(0.320) 
-0.226 
(0.442) 
Size -0.103 
(0.182) 
-0.200 
(0.278) 
Union Influence 0.036 
(0.113) 
-0.081 
(0.162) 
Labour Costs  0.835 
(0.711) 
0.684 
(0.960) 
Chi-squared 24.94 
Log likelihood -211.093 
Number of observations 248 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes:  The reference category is “Formal Performance Appraisal is Based on both Objective and Subjective Criteria” 
            Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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TABLE 4. Determinants of the Person Who Carries Out Formal Performance Appraisal. Probit 
Regressions 
 
Variable Immediate Superior Another Line Manager Person from HRM Department 
Constant -2.329*** 
(0.460) 
1.832*** 
(0.446) 
1.683*** 
(0.427) 
Percent Casuals -0.478 
(0.503) 
0.652 
(0.483) 
-0.094 
(0.448) 
Percent Female  0.056 
(0.224) 
0.207 
(0.221) 
0.022 
(0.222) 
Percent Over 50  -0.461 
(0.366) 
0.591* 
(0.351) 
0.362 
(0.342) 
Turnover -1.075* 
(0.629) 
0.446 
(0.532) 
0.538 
(0.520) 
Autonomy  0.049 
(0.031) 
-0.029 
(0.030) 
-0.010 
(0.028) 
Supervisors Per Worker 
 
-0.728 
(0.890) 
1.222 
(0.838) 
0.201 
(0.821) 
Individual Pay For Performance 0.238** 
(0.120) 
-0.330*** 
(0.115) 
-0.306*** 
(0.116) 
Training 0.222 
(0.168) 
0.024 
(0.165) 
-0.311** 
(0.118) 
HRM Department -0.001 
(0.151) 
-0.077 
(0.146) 
0.133 
(0.145) 
Size 0.279*** 
(0.087) 
-0.267*** 
(0.088) 
-0.216*** 
(0.082) 
Union Influence 0.010 
(0.055) 
0.044 
(0.053) 
0.018 
(0.051) 
Labour Costs  0.006 
(0.347) 
-0.118 
(0.340) 
-0.227 
(0.342) 
Chi-squared 32.63*** 33.36*** 25.96** 
Log likelihood -561.29 -553.25 -531.08 
Number of observations 245 245 245 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
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TABLE 5. Determinants of the Frequency of Formal Performance Appraisal. Ordered Probit Regression 
Variable Frequency of Formal Performance 
Appraisal  
Percent Casuals -0.063 
(0.644) 
Percent Female  -0.039 
(0.314) 
Percent Over 50  -0.134 
(0.491) 
Turnover 1.630** 
(0.783) 
Autonomy  0.011 
(0.040) 
Supervisors Per Worker 
 
-0.189 
(1.341) 
Individual Pay For Performance -0.301* 
(0.155) 
Training 0.017 
(0.214) 
HRM Department -0.367* 
(0.208) 
Size -0.214* 
(0.116) 
Union Influence 0.177** 
(0.073) 
Labour Costs  0.010** 
(0.466) 
Chi-squared 28.25** 
Log likelihood -248.69 
Number of observations 233 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
